For young people, successful entry into the world of work – that is, successful transition from education to employment – means more than simply finding a job. Successful transition occurs only when young people find decent work. What is actually meant by this has been the subject of much debate for a number of years; but its essence is encapsulated in the ILO’s notion of freely chosen and productive employment.
While it can be hard to define precisely what ‘decent work’ looks like, it is fairly clear what it is not. It is not informal employment. It is not work that provides insufficient income to meet basic needs. It does not involve excessive working time or any form of compulsion. Typically, it does involve some degree of job security, protection from arbitrary dismissal, access to social protection, such as health insurance and pension schemes, and freedom of association. Continue reading “What youth need: A greater focus on job quality”
How do mining companies spend their money? If you didn’t know and listened only to the media, you might think such companies spend the most on taxes and royalties. However, you’d be wrong.
When minerals or metals are monetised, the revenue is shared between four main stakeholders in the following ways:
50–65% of mining revenue goes to operating and capital expenditure, such as the suppliers who are paid for their inputs.
15–20% goes to government, which receives its share through royalties and taxes.
15–20% goes to investors who receive profits, typically a residual after the other payments have been made.
10–20% goes to employees who are paid their wages.
A World Gold Council (WGC) study shows that out of the total annual spending in 2012 of USD 55 billion by the 15 WGC members studied, some USD 35 billion were payments to other businesses, mostly subcontracting and procurement. Less than USD 10 billion were royalty and tax payments to governments.
One contention is that balanced development and policy action that lifts the financial, technological, institutional and human capital constraints to productivity will also enable higher productivity in informal firms and thereby formalisation. A growth-inducing productivity agenda is a necessity, but growth alone is not enough to reduce informality. Continue reading “Policy pathways for addressing informality”
Par Victor Harison, commissaire aux affaires économiques de la Commission de l’UA. et Mario Pezzini, l’ancien directeur du Centre de développement de l’OCDE et conseiller spécial auprès du secrétaire général de l’OCDE chargé du développement.
Le « made in Africa » fait son grand retour parmi les priorités des décideurs en Afrique. Ainsi de l’Agenda 2063 de l’Union africaine (UA), qui vise à transformer les économies du continent pour créer une croissance partagée, des emplois décents et des opportunités économiques pour tous. Pourtant il faudra bien davantage que des rêves ambitieux d’industrialisation pour que ce label et cet objectif prennent corps.
By Tabea Lakemann, Research Fellow, GIGA Institute of African Affairs and University of Göttingen, and Jann Lay, Acting Director, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, and Head of GIGA Research Programme Growth and Development
Economic development and a sustained, broad-based increase in living standards on the African1 continent are critically connected to the capacity of African economies to create decent jobs at a rate that keeps up with the rapid growth of the workforce. This, in turn, depends on the ability of African governments to develop innovative, tailor-made strategies towards private sector development taking full advantage of countries’ comparative advantages. Private sector development strategies require governments to recognise the significance of informality and to look beyond industrialisation — to the service sector — for private sector growth and job creation.
The potential of informal firms
On average, the informal economy is estimated to make up almost 40% of GPD in Africa.2 Informal firms are typically much smaller than formal ones, but even when controlling for size, they are on average less productive, less likely to access external finance and have less educated managers.3 At the same time, heterogeneity between informal firms is considerable. Some firms exhibit very high marginal returns to capital, and between 28% and 58% of informal entrepreneurs in West Africa are identified as “constrained gazelles” with low capital stocks, but some unrealised growth potential.4 Many informal firms thus have the likely potential to provide an improved livelihood to their self-employed owners and family members engaged in the business. Continue reading “Services, informality and productivity in Africa”
The informal economy remains a problem when we discuss the prospects of economic development. It is perceived as a hindrance to economic progress because the informal sector does not pay taxes, does not include its employees in social insurance schemes and does little to offer labour law protections. Increasingly, various researchers (La Porta1, Shleifer2, 2014) and international organisations, like the OECD, converge in seeing the informal economy as an obstacle to economic development due to its imminent low productivity. Indeed, informal businesses are concentrated in low productivity sectors. They are, on average, smaller and hence less productive. They generate lower value added. They pay lower wages to their employees and do not train them. And the owners of informal businesses manage their firms less efficiently than their better educated formal sector counterparts.
The informal sector is hence both a symptom of economic backwardness and a drag on economic development. But, can this apparent vicious circle be broken, or is it an economic policy donquichottean task?
By Michael Bratton, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Michigan State University and senior adviser to Afrobarometer, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Executive Director of Afrobarometer and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Beyond the limelight and the headlines, the recent Group of 20 (G20) summit accomplished an important piece of business by launching the Compact with Africa. The next step is crucial: negotiating the priorities that the compact will address.
One key concept is that the compact is with – rather than for – Africa, implying that it will rely on true partnerships to pursue mutually agreed-upon goals.
The informal economy consists of economic activities and units that are not registered with the state and workers who do not receive social protection through their work, both wage-employed and self-employed. The reality of the informal economy in Africa cannot be denied. In fact, informal employment accounts for two-thirds (66%) of non-agricultural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa. But, variation within the region is significant. Informal employment accounts for a smaller share of non-agricultural employment in southern Africa (33% in South Africa and 44% in Namibia) relative to countries in other sub-regions (82% in Mali and 76% in Tanzania) (Vanek et al 2014). Informal employment is a greater source of non-agricultural employment for women (74%) than for men (61%) in the region overall. In seven cities in West Africa with data, informal employment comprises between 76% (Niamey) and 83% (Lomé) of employment. In all seven cities, proportionally more women than men are in informal employment (Herrera et al 2012). Continue reading “The Informal Economy in African Cities: Key to Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Development”
By Juan Carlos Benítez, Economist at the Latin American and Caribbean Unit, and Angel Melguizo, Head of the Latin American and Caribbean Unit, at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Informality equals vulnerability. In emerging economies and particularly in Latin America, informal is normal. On average, 55% of workers in the region did not contribute to pension or healthcare programmes in 2013. Although informality rates vary significantly across countries (Figure 1), a common feature of informality is its large prevalence amongst the poor and low-middle income workers (e.g. Jutting and De Laiglesia, 2009). On average, 85% and 73% of households in the lowest earning quintiles do not have any member contributing to social security schemes. Furthermore, informality is “one of the most striking differences, within the middle sectors, between the vulnerable population and the consolidated middle class” (Lustig and Melguizo, 2015).
A generation ago, private capital flowing into developing countries was a small fraction of aid dollars. In recent years that ratio of aid to investment has flipped, and the amount of investment flowing to the developing world far exceeds aid dollars.
This significant increase in private investment comes at a good time. The cost of addressing the world’s most urgent development challenges outlined last year in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is in the trillions of dollars. Compare that to the estimated USD135 billion per year in total global aid flows.
Development finance institutions like the U.S.-based Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) were built on the understanding that the challenges the world faces are greater than any government can address on its own. They also reflect the conviction that business can serve as a force for good in development. OPIC works to mobilise private capital to support entrepreneurship and expand access to housing, education, financial services, energy and more. Continue reading “Creating jobs in the developing world”